CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1556
7 September 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 SEPTEMBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF NORWAY ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF "AN INTERNATIONAL AGENDA ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: ELEMENTS OF A COMMON UNDERSTANDING" FROM THE OSLO MEETING ON SMALL ARMS, 13-14 JULY 1998

I have the honour to transmit to you "An International Agenda on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Elements of a Common Understanding" from the Oslo meeting on Small Arms, 13-14 July 1998.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for its distribution as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament to all members and participating non-member state delegations.

(Signed) Bjørn Skogmo
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.98-63494

The Oslo Meeting on Small Arms, 13 - 14 July 1998

An International Agenda on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Elements of a Common Understanding

Concerns and Challenges

A number of states, recognizing the problems caused by the excessive availability, accumulation and uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons, met in Oslo 13 and 14 July, 1998, in order to discuss the humanitarian, developmental, and security concerns raised by this issue. In many societies, excessive accumulation and criminal use of these weapons contribute to violations of international humanitarian law, including war crimes, and abuse of human rights. They threaten security, exacerbate violence, increase human suffering and hinder socio-economic development and political stability. They also constitute an obstacle to the implementation of peace agreements, the development of a culture of peace and are an impediment to meaningful development cooperation. A sizable portion of all transfers of small arms and light weapons is illicit and increasingly linked to other transnational criminal activities, and there is a considerable "grey trade".

Due to its complexity the problem will have to be pursued and solutions sought in different fora and in a variety of ways. Governments bear the primary responsibility for addressing these issues. It is therefore encouraging to note the increasing number of governmental initiatives.

Governments recognize that civil society in general and NGOs in particular contribute to our work. They acknowledge the important role of NGOs in conducting and disseminating research, doing field studies, educating the public, providing advise to governments on small arms issues and in delivering humanitarian relief to war-torn societies.

Actions to be taken

Immediate action could focus on the *prevention* of illicit transfers and tighter control in connection with legal transfers. The great number of casualties and the extent of human suffering caused by the use of small arms in war-torn societies point to the urgent need for the *reduction* of such weapons in these situations of conflict.

Prevention aspects

- Enhanced accountability, transparency and improved information exchange on small arms transfers; improved control mechanisms at their manufacture, transit and transfer,

including export and import licenses and notification of shipments. Notification of country of origin after identification of unlawful small arms holdings. Regular information exchange. Strengthen adherence to UN embargoes.

- Cooperation, coordination, training and information sharing among police, intelligence units and customs officials within and between countries.
- Developing and strengthening laws and regulations; increase capacity to combat illicit manufacturing and trafficking; ensure strict enforcement of appropriate laws and regulations on civilian possession of small arms; improve traceability of small arms possession and transfers, e.g. through improved marking.
- Respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law with regard to the use of small arms and light weapons; explore possibilities to strengthen international humanitarian law.
- Develop national and regional mechanisms including codes of conduct in connection with the legal manufacturing, transit, transfers and, where appropriate, reduction of small arms and light weapons.

Reduction aspects

- Support the demobilization and reintegration of combatants at the end of armed conflict, including income generating activities. Collection, safe storage and/or destruction of 'surplus' military weapons and weapons not legally held. Voluntary programs for weapons collection. Integration of these issues into peace accords.
- Seek to reverse cultures of violence. Demilitarization of societies. Contribute to processes of reconciliation.
- Support efforts to establish trustworthy judicial and penal systems and to train local police. Support security sector reform in post-conflict societies.

The process ahead

The participating states believe that in order to address these problems effectively and coherently, governments need to intensify and harmonize the efforts that have been made. This includes the need to develop further a common understanding of the issues as well as of practical ways of approaching the problems presented by small arms and light weapons.

We recognize the important role of the United Nations in global efforts. Governments need to pursue their priorities in global, regional, sub-regional and national settings in a coherent manner. We encourage other governments to participate in common efforts to find practical solutions to these problems. At this point in time regional and subregional arrangements seem to be particularly promising. We also recognize the need for international cooperation, i.a. with regard to meeting resource and technology requirements.

We welcome and commend the various endeavours currently being undertaken in different areas and at different levels. Governments are encouraged to support the existing global and regional initiatives - such as those listed in Annex I - and explore the feasibility of further initiatives, globally and in other regions and subregions.

Annex I

Global and regional initiatives:

- The UN Secretary General's Report on Small Arms of 1997
- The UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms
- The UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: Planned Transnational Organised Crime Convention, Protocol on Firearms
- Proposed International Conference on the Illicit Arms Trade in all its Aspects
- The Interamerican Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Their Component Parts
- The OAS/CICAD Model Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, their Parts, Components and Ammunition
- The Mali Proposal on a Moratorium on the Manufacture, Export and Import of Light Weapons in West Africa
- The OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers
- The OECD/DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development
- The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports
- The EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms



CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1557
8 September 1998

Original: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

		Paragraph(s)	Page
I.	INTRODUCTION	1	3
II.	ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE CONFERENCE	2 - 22	3 - 11
A.	1998 Session of the Conference	2 - 4	3
B.	Participants in the work of the Conference	5	3 - 4
C.	Agenda and Programme of Work for the the 1998 Session	6 - 11	4 - 9
D.	Attendance and Participation of States not Members of the Conference	12 - 13	9
E.	Expansion of the Membership of the Conference	14 - 17	9 - 10
F.	Review of the Agenda of the Conference	18 - 19	10
G.	Improved and Effective Functioning of the Conference	20 - 21	10 - 11
H.	Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations	22	11

		Paragraph(s)	Page
III.	SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE DURING ITS 1998 SESSION	23 - 50	11 - 29
A.	Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament	26 - 32	12 - 18
B.	Prevention of Nuclear War, including all Related Matters	33 - 34	18 - 19
C.	Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space	35 - 37	19
D.	Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons	38	19 - 40
E.	New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons; Radiological Weapons	39	41
F.	Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament	40 - 43	41 - 44
	- Anti-Personnel Landmines	41 - 43	41 - 44
G.	Transparency in Armaments	44 - 46	44 - 45
H.	Consideration of Other Areas Dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures	47	45 - 53
I.	Consideration and Adoption of the Annual Report of the Conference and any other Report as Appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations	48 - 50	53

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Conference on Disarmament submits to the fifty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly its annual report on its 1998 session, together with the pertinent documents and records.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

A. 1998 Session of the Conference

2. The Conference was in session from 19 January to 27 March, 11 May to 26 June and 27 July to 9 September 1998. During this period, the Conference held 29 formal plenary meetings, at which member States as well as non-member States invited to participate in the discussions set forth their views and recommendations on the various questions before the Conference.

3. The Conference also held 33 informal meetings on its agenda, programme of work, organization and procedures, as well as on items of its agenda and other matters.

4. In accordance with rule 9 of the rules of procedure, the following member States assumed successively the Presidency of the Conference: Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

B. Participants in the Work of the Conference

5. Representatives of the following member States participated in the work of the Conference: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri

Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

C. Agenda and Programme of Work for the 1998 Session

6. At the 779th plenary meeting on 20 January 1998, the Conference adopted its agenda for the 1998 session in conformity with the rules of procedure. The agenda (CD/1484) reads as follows:

"Taking into account, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and pending the conclusion of its consultations on the review of its agenda, and without prejudice to their outcome, the Conference adopts the following agenda for its 1998 session:

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

2. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

3. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

4. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

7. Transparency in armaments.

8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations."

7. After the adoption of the agenda, the President made the following

statement: "In connection with the adoption of the agenda, I, as the President of the Conference, should like to state that it is my understanding that if there is a consensus in the Conference to deal with any issues, they could be dealt with within this agenda".

8. During the first part of the annual session, successive Presidents of the Conference conducted intensive consultations with a view to reaching consensus on the programme of work. Also, during plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations expressed their views on this issue. These are duly reflected in plenary records. At its 791st plenary meeting on 26 March 1998, the President of the Conference made the following Declaration (CD/1500):

> "After having identified Agenda Item 1 entitled "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament" as being of an extremely high priority, and after having used all means of consultations provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the Conference, the President came to the conclusion that the only way to move forward on substance at this stage would consist in substantially increasing consultations regarding this item, under his authority by using all possibilities, including the assistance of the outgoing and the incoming Presidents, with a view to reaching consensus on how to deal with this item.
>
> The Presidency is thus willing to consider henceforth Agenda Item 1 as its first priority, to vigorously continue its efforts in this respect and to present early and regular reports on these consultations throughout the session, including before the end of the second part of the 1998 session."

Following this Declaration, the Conference adopted Decision CD/1501, which reads as follows:

> "The Conference takes the following decisions:
>
> 1. That the Presidency, taking into account the statement (CD/1500), made by the President at the 791st plenary meeting on 26 March 1998, shall

pursue intensive consultations and seek the views of its Members on appropriate methods and approaches for dealing with agenda item 1 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", taking into consideration all proposals and views on this item.

2. The Conference establishes, for the duration of the 1998 session, an ad hoc committee under agenda item 4 entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These arrangements could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

The ad hoc committee shall take into consideration all relevant views and proposals present and future and also address questions related to its mandate.

The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1998 session.

3. The Conference appoints a Special Coordinator under agenda item 3 entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" to seek the views of its Members on the most appropriate way to deal with the questions related to this item.

4. The Conference appoints a Special Coordinator under agenda item 6 entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" to seek the views of its Members on the most appropriate way to deal with the questions related to anti-personnel landmines taking into account, inter alia, developments outside the Conference.

5. The Conference appoints a Special Coordinator under agenda item 7 entitled "Transparency in armaments" to seek the views of its Members on the most appropriate way to deal with the questions related to this item.

6. In implementing these decisions, the Presidency and the Special Coordinators shall take into consideration all relevant views and proposals, present and future.

7. The Conference requests the Presidency and the Special Coordinators to present early and regular reports on the outcome of their consultations throughout the session, including before the end of the second part of its 1998 session.

8. The Conference also decides to appoint Special Coordinators on the Review of its Agenda, the Expansion of its Membership and its Improved and Effective Functioning. These Special Coordinators, in discharging their duties and functions, will take into account all proposals and views, as well as future initiatives. The Conference requests these Special Coordinators to report to it before the conclusion of the 1998 session.

9. The taking of these decisions contained in paragraphs 1, 3, 4 and 5 does not prejudge the positions of delegations on the eventual establishment of subsidiary bodies on the issues identified, but reflects agreement to advance the Conference's work with a view to reaching consensus. This decision is also taken without prejudice to the rights of Members of the Conference to move forward with positions and proposals already made or to be put forward in the future."

9. At the 792nd plenary meeting on 14 May 1998, the Conference appointed Ambassador Antonio de Icaza of Mexico as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador John Campbell of Australia as Special Coordinator on Anti-Personnel Landmines, Ambassador H.M.G.S. Palihakkara of Sri Lanka as Special Coordinator on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Mr. Pavel Grecu of Romania as Special Coordinator on Transparency in Armaments, Ambassador Javier Illanes of Chile as Special Coordinator on Improved and Effective Functioning of the Conference, Ambassador Péter Náray of Hungary as Special Coordinator on Review of the Agenda of the Conference, and Ambassador Erwin Hofer of Switzerland as Special Coordinator on

Expansion of the Membership of the Conference.

10. At the 802nd plenary meeting on 11 August 1998, the Conference adopted the decision on the establishment of an ad hoc committee under item 1 of the agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" (CD/1547), which reads as follows:

> "The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee which shall negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
>
> The Ad Hoc Committee shall present a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1998 session."

Following the adoption of this decision, the President made the following statement (CD/1548):

> "In connection with the decision we have just taken, I should like, in my capacity as President of the Conference, to state that the adoption of this decision is without prejudice to any further decisions on the establishment of further subsidiary bodies under agenda item 1 which may result from the provisions of paragraph 1 of decision CD/1501, and that the presidency will continue to pursue intensive consultations and to seek the views of the members of the Conference on appropriate methods and approaches for dealing with agenda item 1, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", taking into consideration all proposals and views in this respect."

11. At the 804th plenary meeting on 20 August 1998, the Conference appointed Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee under item

1 of the agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

D. Attendance and Participation of States not Members of the Conference

12. In conformity with rule 32 of the rules of procedure, the States not members of the Conference listed under the following paragraph attended its plenary meetings.

13. The Conference received and considered requests for participation in its work from 47 States not members of the Conference. In accordance with the rules of procedure and its decision taken at its 1990 session on its improved and effective functioning (CD/1036), the Conference invited the following non-member States to participate in its work: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Brunei Darussalam, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Nepal, Oman, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovenia, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia.

E. Expansion of the Membership of the Conference

14. The importance attached to the question of the expansion of its membership was duly recognized by the Conference and is reflected in the statements made by delegations in plenary meetings.

15. Requests for membership had been received, since 1982, from the following non-members, in chronological order: Ireland, Tunisia, Ecuador, Greece, Croatia, Kuwait, Portugal, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Malaysia, Costa Rica, Denmark, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Ghana, Luxembourg, Uruguay, Philippines, Azerbaijan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Armenia and Thailand.

16. The following document relating to the issue was presented to the Conference:

- CD/1497, dated 17 February 1998, entitled "Letter dated 12 February 1998 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Azerbaijan containing the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning Azerbaijan's application for full membership in the Conference on Disarmament".

17. In discharging his mandate, the Special Coordinator held a number of bilateral and open-ended consultations with members and participating non-members of the Conference, and presented his report in a statement at the 807th plenary meeting on 8 September 1998 (CD/PV.807).

F. Review of the Agenda of the Conference

18. The Conference continued to attach importance to the review of its agenda. The issue was addressed by delegations in plenary as well as in informal meetings.

19. In discharging his mandate, the Special Coordinator held a number of bilateral and open-ended consultations with members and participating non-members of the Conference, and presented his report in a statement at the 805th plenary meeting on 27 August 1998 (CD/PV.805).

G. Improved and Effective Functioning of the Conference

20. The Conference continued to recognize the importance of its improved and effective functioning. The issue was addressed by delegations in plenary as well as in informal meetings.

21. In discharging his mandate, the Special Coordinator held a number of bilateral and open-ended consultations with members and participating non-

members of the Conference, and presented his report in a statement at the 805th plenary meeting on 27 August 1998(CD/PV.805).

H. Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations

22. In accordance with rule 42 of the rules of procedure, a list of all communications from non-governmental organizations and persons was circulated to the Conference (document CD/NGC.32).

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE DURING ITS 1998 SESSION

23. The substantive work of the Conference during its 1998 session was based on its agenda and programme of work. The list of documents issued by the Conference, as well as the texts of those documents, are included as appendix I to the report. An index of the verbatim records by country and subject, listing the statements made by delegations during 1998, and the verbatim records of the meetings of the Conference, are attached as appendix II to the report.

24. The Conference had before it a letter dated 23 December 1997 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations (CD/1481) transmitting all the resolutions dealing with or related to disarmament and international security adopted by the General Assembly at its fifty-second session in 1997, including those making specific reference to the Conference on Disarmament:

52/36 "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" (operative paras. 2, 4 and 5)

52/37 "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" (operative paras. 5, 6 and 8)

52/38 H "Contributions towards banning anti-personnel landmines" (operative para. 3)

52/38 I "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes" (operative paras. 1, 4 and 5)

52/38 L "Nuclear disarmament" (operative paras. 5, 6 and 7)

52/38 P "Regional disarmament" (operative para. 1)

52/38 Q "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels" (operative para. 2)

52/38 R "Transparency in armaments" (operative para. 7)

52/39 C "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons" (operative paras. 1 and 2)

52/40 A "Report of the Conference on Disarmament" (operative paras. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7)

52/40 B "Report of the Disarmament Commission" (operative para. 2)

52/40 C "Role of the United Nations in Disarmament (operative para. 7)

25. At its 779th plenary meeting on 20 January 1998 the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General conveyed to the Conference a message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the opening of the 1998 session (CD/PV.779).

A. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament

26. During the course of the session, intensive consultations were held on appropriate methods and approaches for dealing with this item, taking into consideration all proposals and views.

27. The following documents relating to this item were submitted to the Conference:

(a) CD/1483, dated 20 January 1998, submitted by the delegation of South Africa entitled "Draft decision and mandate on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament".

(b) CD/1485, dated 21 January 1998, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled "Working paper with regard to an ad hoc committee on a fissile material cut-off treaty";

(c) CD/1486, dated 21 January 1998, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled "Working paper concerning CD action on nuclear disarmament".

(d) CD/1492, dated 3 February 1998, submitted by the delegation of Austria, entitled "Draft decision on the reestablishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices";

(e) CD/1496, dated 12 February 1998, submitted by the delegation of Belgium, entitled "Proposal on nuclear issues".

(f) CD/1516, dated 28 May 1998, submitted by the delegation of Japan, entitled "Seminar Conference on Technical Issues for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, 11 and 12 May 1998, Geneva, Chairman's Summary";

(g) CD/1542, dated 11 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 10 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the English and Spanish texts of the Joint Declaration relating to Nuclear Disarmament of 9 June 1998 by the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden".

(h) CD/1545, dated 31 July 1998, submitted by the delegation of Algeria, entitled "Proposal under item 1 of the agenda of the Conference on

Disarmament 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament'".

(i) CD/1549, dated 12 August 1998, entitled "Statement by the Group of 21".

28. The following documents relating to this item, which were submitted in previous sessions, were considered by a number of delegations to remain valid and relevant for consideration by the Conference:

(a) CD/1388, dated 14 March 1996 submitted by the Group of 21 entitled "Proposal for the Establishment of an Ad-Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament";

(b) CD/1419, dated 7 August 1996 submitted by 28 members of the Group of 21 entitled "Proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of Nuclear Weapons";

(c) CD/1450, dated 20 March 1997, submitted by the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, entitled "Proposal on the programme of work";

(d) CD/1453, dated 1 April 1997 submitted by the delegation of Egypt containing a possible mandate for an Ad-Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament;

(e) CD/1462, dated 5 June 1997 submitted by the Group of 21 entitled "Proposal on a Programme of Work";

(f) CD/1463, dated 12 June 1997 submitted by 26 members of the G-21 entitled "Proposed Mandate for an Ad-Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament".

29. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item. These are duly recorded in the plenary records of this session.

30. Successive Presidents presented to the Conference progress reports on the intensive consultations undertaken pursuant to paragraph 1 of decision CD/1501, taking into account the statement made by the President in CD/1500. These are

contained in the records of the Conference (CD/PV.798; CD/PV.803; and CD/PV.806). These reports indicated that, although the consultations were wide-ranging and substantive, they were inconclusive, and that further consultations in this regard would be required. The last President of the session accordingly recommended (CD/PV.806) that intensive consultations pursuant to paragraph 1 of decision CD/1501, taking into account the statement made by the President in CD/1500, should resume at the start of the 1999 session.

31. Furthermore, as noted in paragraph 10 above, the Conference decided to establish an ad hoc committee under item 1 of the agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (CD/1547). Following the adoption of this decision, the President stated that the adoption of that decision was without prejudice to any further decisions on the establishment of any further subsidiary bodies under this agenda item, and that the Presidency would continue to pursue intensive consultations with a view to developing consensus on an appropriate mechanism to deal with other aspects of agenda item 1 (CD/1548).

32. At the 807th plenary meeting on 8 September 1998, the Conference adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Committee under item 1 of the agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" established at the 802nd plenary meeting on 11 August 1998 (see paragraph 10 above). That report (CD/1555) is an integral part of this report and reads as follows:

"I. INTRODUCTION

"1. At its 802nd plenary meeting, on 11 August 1998, the Conference on Disarmament decided 'to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee which shall negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive

devices. The Ad Hoc Committee shall present a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1998 session.' (CD/1547)

In connection with the above decision, the President of the Conference made the following statement: 'In connection with the decision we have just taken, I should like, in my capacity as President of the Conference, to state that the adoption of this decision is without prejudice to any further decisions on the establishment of further subsidiary bodies under agenda item 1 which may result from the provisions of paragraph 1 of decision CD/1501, and that the presidency will continue to pursue intensive consultations and to seek the views of the members of the Conference on appropriate methods and approaches for dealing with agenda item 1, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", taking into consideration all proposals and views in this respect.' (CD/1548)

"II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTS

"2. At its 804th plenary meeting, on 20 August 1998, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for the current session. Mr. Jerzy Zaleski, Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee.

"3. The Ad Hoc Committee held 2 meetings from 27 August to 1 September 1998. In addition, the Chairman conducted a number of informal consultations with delegations.

"4. The following documents were submitted during the annual session of the Conference on Disarmament and were considered relevant to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee:

- CD/1485, dated 21 January 1998, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled 'Working paper with regard to an ad hoc committee on a fissile material cut-off treaty'.

- CD/1490, dated 28 January 1998, submitted by the delegation of the United States of America, entitled 'Statement from the President of the United States upon the Occasion of the Opening Plenary of the 1998 Session of the Conference on Disarmament'.

- CD/1492, dated 3 February 1998, submitted by the delegation of Austria, entitled 'Draft decision on the reestablishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'.

- CD/1516, dated 28 May 1998, submitted by the delegation of Japan, entitled 'Seminar Conference on Technical Issues for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, 11 and 12 May 1998, Geneva, Chairman's Summary'.

- CD/1542, dated 11 June 1998, entitled 'Letter dated 10 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the English and Spanish texts of the Joint Declaration relating to Nuclear Disarmament of 9 June 1998 by the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden'.

- CD/1545, dated 31 July 1998, submitted by the delegation of Algeria, entitled 'Proposal under item 1 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"'.

- CD/1547, dated 11 August 1998, entitled 'Decision on the establishment of an ad hoc committee under item 1 of the agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"'.

- CD/1548, dated 11 August 1998, entitled 'Statement made by the President following the adoption of decision CD/1547 on the establishment of an ad hoc committee under item 1 of the agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"'.

- CD/1549, dated 12 August 1998, entitled 'Statement by the Group

of 21'.

- CD/1550 dated 12 August 1998, entitled 'Letter dated 12 August 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Austria addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of a press statement by the Austrian Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schussel in his capacity as President of the Council of the European Union on the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material used in nuclear weapons issued in Vienna on 11 August 1998'.

- CD/1551, dated 18 August 1998, entitled 'Letter dated 14 August 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the Philippines addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the statement of the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Domingo L. Siazon, on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material'.

"III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1998 SESSION

"5. During the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, delegations had a general exchange of views, as a first step in the substantive negotiations.

"IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

"6. It was agreed to recommend to the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of the 1999 session."

B. Prevention of Nuclear War, including all Related Matters

33. The Conference did not establish an Ad Hoc Committee on this agenda item during the 1998 session. No new documents were submitted to the Conference specifically under the agenda item during the 1998 session.

34. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or

further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item, the detailed descriptions of which were duly recorded in the previous annual reports of the Conference, in particular paragraphs 62-71 of the 1992 report to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/1173), related official documents and working papers, as well as plenary records.

C. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

35. The Conference on Disarmament did not establish an Ad Hoc Committee on this agenda item during the 1998 session. The following document relating to this item was presented to the Conference:

- CD/1487, dated 21 January 1998, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled "Working paper concerning CD action on outer space".

36. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item. These are duly recorded in the plenary records of this session.

37. In discharging his mandate, the Special Coordinator appointed to seek the views of the Members of the Conference on the most appropriate way to deal with the questions related to this item, held a number of bilateral and open-ended consultations with members and participating non-members of the Conference and presented his reports in statements made on 11 June 1998 and 27 August 1998 respectively (CD/PV.797 and CD/PV.805).

D. Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

38. At the 807th plenary meeting on 8 September 1998, the Conference adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons established under agenda item 4 at the 791st plenary meeting on 26 March

1998 (see paragraph 8 above). That report (CD/1554) is an integral part of this report and reads as follows:

"I. INTRODUCTION

"1. At its 791st plenary meeting on 26 March 1998, the Conference on Disarmament decided 'to establish for the duration of its 1998 session an Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 4, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These arrangements could take the form of an internationally legally-binding instrument. The Ad Hoc Committee shall take into consideration all relevant views and proposals present and future and also address questions related to its mandate' (CD/1501).

"II. ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK AND DOCUMENTS

"2. At its 792nd plenary meeting on 14 May 1998, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Antonio de Icaza of Mexico as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. V. Bogomolov, Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee.

"3. Between 19 May and 1 September 1998, the Ad Hoc Committee held 9 meetings. The Chairman also conducted informal consultations on specific concrete aspects of the agenda item, as well as several meetings with Group Co-ordinators and other representatives.

"4. The following new documents were submitted to the Committee in connection with the item during the 1998 session:

CD/1502 Dated 2 April 1998, submitted by Canada, entitled 'Questions related to work in the

	Conference on Disarmament on Negative Security Assurances'
CD/1534	Dated 28 May 1998, submitted by Colombia, entitled 'Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement. Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 19-20 May 1998'
CD/1542	Dated 11 June 1998, submitted by Sweden, entitled 'Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden'
CD/SA/WP.15/Add.1	Dated 5 June 1998, entitled 'Addendum to Compilation of basic documents relating to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'
and Corr.1 (English only)	Dated 15 June 1998
CD/SA/WP.20*	Dated 11 August 1998, entitled 'Programme of Work'
CD/SA/WP.21	Dated 26 August 1998, entitled 'Draft report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'

"III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK

"5. During the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, various delegations reaffirmed their respective positions, the detailed descriptions of which can be found in the related Conference documents and the Plenary Records, or further elaborated them. A summary of the views and national positions as stated in the Ad Hoc Committee during the deliberations in 1998 is annexed to this report.

"6. During the general exchange of views, most delegations reiterated the particular importance they attached to the question of international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and expressed their readiness to engage in a search for a mutually acceptable solution of the issue.

"7. In addition to the general exchange of views and in accordance with the Programme of Work, the Ad Hoc Committee held a number of meetings devoted to structured, thematic discussions of the following issues:

Nature and scope of existing negative security assurances

United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995)
Declarations of Nuclear-Weapon States
Protocols to the Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaties
and their interpretative statements

(a) Common and distinctive elements

(b) Needed clarifications

- invasion
- aggression
- attack
- dependent territories
- security commitment

- association or alliance

(c) New developments

Positive security assurances

"IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

"8. The Ad Hoc Committee reaffirmed that, pending the complete and effective elimination of nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the relationship between the question of negative and positive security assurances was noted.

"9. It was felt that any further negotiations on the issue of negative security assurances should take fully into account the outcome of the 1998 deliberations in the Committee as well as the recommendations and suggestions of the previous sessions.

"10. It was agreed to recommend to the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of the 1999 session.

"A N N E X

"The following is a summary of the views and national positions expressed in the Ad Hoc Committee in 1998.

"1. During the general exchange of views, various States insisted on the legitimate character of the claims of non-nuclear-weapon States for negative security assurances and felt that there was a need to step up efforts and to proceed to negotiations with a view to reaching agreement as soon as possible. Some of them reiterated their deep conviction that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons was the only effective assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and stressed the necessity to

recognize the right of non-nuclear-weapon States not to be attacked or threatened with these weapons. They reaffirmed the need to conclude a multilateral agreement of a legally-binding character. Some delegations reiterated their view that non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT or to regional nuclear-weapon-free zones were entitled to immediate, unconditional, legally-binding and comprehensive security assurances, which would not be limited in scope, framework or duration, since they had already fulfilled their engagement towards non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

"2. Some delegations underlined that negative security assurances were an essential element for those countries which did not possess nuclear weapons and an essential step in the process of non-proliferation in all its aspects. In their view, such assurances should be enshrined in a legally-binding instrument, negotiated multilaterally, for which the Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate forum, and these assurances should be unconditional and based on an unequivocal, unambiguous, straight-forward formula. There was an opinion that security assurances had been established as an important element in the non-proliferation regime, but that there was a difference of appreciation on the content, on the scope and on the legal instrument that was to contain them. Certain delegations stressed that the conclusion of arrangements containing security assurances should not be construed as legitimizing the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons, and the only effective and credible guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was the total elimination of these weapons and therefore of the threat posed by their existence.

"3. A number of delegations mentioned, with appreciation, the contribution of Canada, which had raised very pertinent questions related to the work in the Conference on Disarmament on negative security assurances (CD/1502).

"4. Addressing the issue of current military doctrines and the role of nuclear weapons, certain delegations noted that nuclear weapons had been devised to counter other nuclear weapons in a given political situation, which had disappeared, and the new political environment required reconsideration of the perception of threat and of the role of nuclear

weapons in the contemporary world.

"5. A number of States continued to maintain that until total elimination of nuclear weapons was achieved, as an interim measure, there existed on the part of nuclear-weapon States an obligation to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and also that these weapons would not be used as instruments of pressure, intimidation or blackmail. This obligation should be of an internationally, legally-binding character - clear, credible, universal and without discrimination.

"6. One delegation stated that it would continue to call for the need to arrive at the global elimination of nuclear weapons. It emphasized that the positive assurances contained in Security Council resolution 255 did not meet the requirements of legally-binding assurances. The negative security assurances contained in Security Council resolution 984 did not meet the necessary requirements either, especially as unilateral and multilateral declarations were conditional declarations and were not global. This was why the sole negotiating forum to conclude an international legally-binding treaty was the Conference on Disarmament, and it was the first time that the Committee on Security Assurances had met since the NPT Review and Extension Conference was held in 1995 and Decision 2 on 'Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament' was adopted there. It stressed that security assurances, whether positive or negative, had to be global, and they had to be the subject of negotiations within this Conference and within this Committee.

"7. One State was of the view that negative security assurances, a long-standing demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States, was not accorded the same priority as the other items on the nuclear non-proliferation agenda and in fact, remained its poor cousin. According to that delegation, the consideration of security assurances had been plagued from the beginning with linkage, not with the objectives of nuclear disarmament, but with those of non-proliferation. Seen in the latter perspective, security assurances had remained confined to what the nuclear-weapon States had thought fit to provide at their discretion. There remained an unfulfilled need for these

assurances to be multilaterally negotiated, legally-binding and comprehensive. Security assurances remained as interim measures without an objective, save that of finding a place in a framework that enabled the nuclear-weapon States to retain *in perpetuity* their privileged possession of nuclear weapons. Partial and conditional pledges of non-use of nuclear weapons, whether undertaken unilaterally or in separate undertakings, could not be the basis for credible guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. The State recalled that it had expressed strong reservations with the approach employed in United Nations Security Council resolution 255, which had been repeated in Security Council resolution 984 adopted on the eve of the indefinite extension of the NPT. It believed that the continuation of the same approach would not yield fruitful results. It emphasized that the United Nations Charter did not discriminate between those that might adhere to a particular treaty or those that might not, and the responsibility of the United Nations Security Council was to all Member States of the United Nations, without discrimination. The NPT, as it stood today, could not reflect ground realities and would be an inadequate framework for the consideration of security assurances. Thus, it did not recognize any linkage between the objectives of this Ad Hoc Committee and the NPT. It also indicated that the consideration of security assurances in the narrow strait-jacket of nuclear-weapon-free zones could not do justice to the wide variety of concerns that emanated from the global nature of the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Moreover, it did not consider the Conference on Disarmament as the appropriate forum for the consideration of regional issues. However, it respected the sovereign choice exercised by non-nuclear-weapon States in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. In this context, it had recently stated that it fully respected the status of the South East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and was ready to convert this commitment into a legal obligation. It also remained responsive to the expressed need for commitments to other nuclear-weapon-free zones. The State believed that a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons could form the bedrock of security assurances - comprehensive, legally-binding and irreversible. It recalled that it had proposed for consideration a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons as an annex to

United Nations General Assembly resolution 52/39C. It believed that such a convention could contribute to the lessening of the nuclear threat and to the climate for negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. This Ad Hoc Committee could also consider various proposals for the global de-alerting and de-targetting of nuclear weapons, with the necessary verification mechanisms. The delegation was also willing to discuss ways of strengthening and giving expression, in a multilateral framework, to the provisions contained in the 1973 agreement between the USA and the USSR on the prevention of nuclear war. The delegation stated that as a responsible nuclear-weapon State, it had a declared policy of a minimum deterrent and 'no-first-use' of nuclear weapons against all countries and 'no-use' of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. It was willing to strengthen this by entering into bilateral agreements on no-first-use or multilateral negotiations on a global no-first-use.

"8. One delegation emphasized that the need for security assurances arose from the existence of nuclear weapons, which were weapons of mass destruction, and their retention by any State - five, six, seven - was an aberration from the norm in which all weapons of mass destruction were supposed to be eliminated. In its view, it was an obligation on the nuclear-weapon States to provide such assurances, because under the international system, every State is entitled to equal security, and the possession of weapons of mass destruction gravely distorted this principle of equal security for all States and opened the door to blackmail and coercion, which was unacceptable as a means for the conduct of international relations under the United Nations Charter. The need for security assurances also arose fundamentally from the provisions of the United Nations Charter which very clearly stipulated that States had undertaken not to use or threaten to use force, and that meant all kinds of force with any kind of weapon. This State believed that it was only reasonable and logical that the provisions of the Charter on non-use of force also applied equally and with equal force to the question of the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The provision of security assurances derived as an obligation from the United Nations Charter and it was incumbent on all those States which retained nuclear weapons to be bound by these provisions of the United Nations Charter, not to

use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, not only against non-nuclear-weapon States but also against each other. It disagreed with those nuclear-weapon States which had chosen to interpret the requirement for security assurances as merely being related to the NPT as a part of the 'NPT bargain', that while they retained nuclear weapons, those parties to the NPT who were non-nuclear-weapon States were the only ones who were entitled to such assurances. This delegation had consistently argued that such a position was contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter and it created distinctions between States on the basis of their adherence to a particular treaty, which did not override the United Nations Charter. The distinction which had been drawn in resolution 255, and particularly in resolution 984, between the Parties to the NPT and non-Parties to the NPT had always been a false distinction which derogated the provisions of the Charter relating to collective security and the right of self-defence. Turning to the questions of who should give security assurances and to whom, it recalled that there were currently three categories of possible States who were to give security assurances - five nuclear-weapon States recognized by the NPT, one State which had demonstrated a nuclear-weapons capability and had declared itself as a nuclear-weapon State, and another State which had demonstrated nuclear-weapons capability, but had not claimed nuclear-weapons status. There was one State which was presumed to have nuclear-weapons capability and was also, like the last two, not a Party to the NPT. In this respect, the delegation felt that this was a most relevant question that the Committee would need to address in its deliberations. The current political landscape became even more complicated than ever before due to the fact that new military doctrines today envisaged the use and indeed, even the first use, of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, even those Parties to the NPT or nuclear-weapon-free zones, in the event that they possessed or threatened to use or actually used any other weapon of mass destruction. Therefore, according to this delegation, the scope of the threat of use of nuclear weapons had become broader. In the present political situation what was required was to go back to the provisions on collective security envisaged in the United Nations Charter and to try to see whether it was not possible for all States to provide mutual guarantees of non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons in the same way and with the same clarity that the United Nations members had

committed themselves to the non-use of force or threat of force under the Charter.

"9. Another delegation stated that one test of the commitment to security assurances should be the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the Protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. The development and conclusion of new nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties, especially in the areas of tension, would be a valuable step forward and one which this country supported on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the countries concerned. However, in its view, extending security assurances further through a single international and legally-binding instrument would be a complex challenge. Variance and nuances in current nuclear doctrines would point to difficulties in seeking a single instrument.

"10. Another delegation stated its openness to finding a suitable solution which would consist in setting up a universal and legally-binding treaty. It considered that the time was ripe for entrusting the Chairman with the preparation of an outline of a multilateral treaty. As a first step, the delegation considered that it would be wise to start with negative security assurances, clarifying that their content had to be consistent with article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the threat and use of force. In any case, should a treaty on negative security assurances be elaborated and negotiated, the parties which were non-nuclear-weapon States should be obliged to maintain their status in order to continue to claim negative security assurances. The latter should be given to all States parties to any treaty prohibiting the possession of nuclear weapons.

"11. Another delegation stressed that non-nuclear-weapon States that had legally renounced their nuclear options had the legitimate right to demand negative security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States. It stressed that one of the fundamental premises of the NPT was of a discriminatory nature. Therefore, the implementation of article VI of the NPT on nuclear disarmament and the issue of negative security assurances was crucial in order to rectify the discriminatory nature of that Treaty. Security assurances were not only necessary for enhancing the actual security of non-

nuclear-weapon States but also relevant to the maintenance and consolidation of the non-proliferation regime itself. It believed that the unilateral declarations by the five nuclear-weapon States in 1995 and Security Council resolution 984 of the same year were significant and their value should not be underestimated. Nor should the importance of paragraph 8 of the Principles and Objectives of the Final Document of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference be neglected. Therefore, in accordance with that paragraph, that State supported efforts to seek further steps in the context of negative security assurances to determine whether such steps could indeed take the form of an international, legally-binding instrument.

"12. In this regard, another group of States recalled that in view of the importance they attached to the issue of security assurances, they had extended unilaterally, in April 1995, both negative and positive security assurances, of which the Security Council took note in resolution 984. Some of these countries recognized that States which had renounced nuclear weapons were entitled to look for assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against them.

"13. One of those countries stressed that in the current state of affairs, security assurances were an instrument of protection for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons by nuclear-weapon States. It elaborated two aspects of its approach to security assurances, regional and global. In its view the regional dimension had become increasingly affirmed in recent years through the creation and consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Because of them, about a hundred States enjoyed negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon States under Protocols annexed to the treaties creating these nuclear-weapon-free zones. It recalled that its Government had ratified all the Protocols to the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba Treaties and was prepared, in the same constructive spirit, to follow the events in Central Asia where five States had committed themselves to the creation of a new nuclear-weapon-free zone, as well as in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and South Asia. Speaking of the global dimension of negative security assurances, it recalled that its security assurances had been renewed and developed in its statement of

6 April 1995 in the Conference on Disarmament and reflected in Security Council resolution 984. The State suggested that important complementary work could take the following direction: to facilitate the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones where the United Nations General Assembly recommends so, and to draw up elements for the harmonization of negative security assurances, in particular, instruments where nuclear States could accede to the view of favouring the co-operation between existing zones and the emergence of new zones, favouring specific solutions in respect of concerns of a State that could find itself in a very unique situation. It reaffirmed that it wished this work to take place in the Conference on Disarmament and not within the framework of preparatory work for the NPT Review Conference, which could provide a place for useful, complementary discussions but where all the various protagonists would not be parties to the deliberations. Regarding the scope of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, the delegation stated that it had no objection to discussing the question of positive security assurances, though the question of negative security assurances was, perhaps, the one on which more concrete and more fruitful, results could be achieved.

"14. Another nuclear-weapon State stated that the drafting and provision of security guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in April 1995 to the States which had voluntarily given up their acquisition was an important point in strengthening the non-proliferation regime, which was necessary for ensuring stability in the world. This was particularly important, given the recent events in South Asia. It recalled that apart from the harmonized unilateral declarations of 1995, that State had also provided, together with the United States and the United Kingdom, security guarantees to Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine in 1994. It hoped that it would soon be possible to reach agreement on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia, which would make it possible to provide guarantees to another eleven States. In this context, the delegation supported the initiative of Belarus on creating a nuclear-weapon-free space in Central and Eastern Europe. It was thought that a more careful consideration of the Belarus proposal could be an important step towards freeing another important region from the threat of nuclear weapons. This State had also been

following with interest the process of the discussion of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. It emphasized that by increasing the number of zones and areas, there would be more countries with such assurances. In its view, it would be important to seek results within the framework of regional agreements. These should be sought in addition to already existing agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones. The agreements of this kind would certainly be easier to obtain if the States in these regions were to become Parties to the NPT. It was clear that these guarantees had to be on the basis of clear and unambiguous obligations that the non-nuclear-weapon States did not acquire or did not possess, use or deploy nuclear weapons on their territories.

"15. Another nuclear-weapon State pointed out that any discussion of effective international arrangements needed to be held with the understanding that there were various security assurances already in existence, and one of the key issues before this Committee was, could the existing arrangements be improved upon? With the regard to the scope of the Committee's mandate, it thought that the focus should be on negative security assurances, but it could support discussions on positive security assurances as was clearly demonstrated in the Presidential Statement of 5 April 1995, which addressed both negative security assurances and positive security assurances. It recalled that its unilateral declaration of 1995 was of mutual benefit to all nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States.

"16. Another nuclear-weapon State felt that in view of the fact that the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States had undertaken to abandon the option of developing nuclear weapons, they were fully justified in demanding the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. Prior to the complete prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons, all the nuclear-weapon States should undertake that under no circumstances or conditions would they use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. The new situation, since the end of the Cold War, should provide new opportunities for resolving issues related to negative security assurances. The nuclear-weapon States should give more consideration to the just demand of most of the non-nuclear-

weapon States and adopt more positive, just and reasonable attitudes and policies towards the negative security assurances issues, which was not a unilateral favour granted by the nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States, but rather an obligation that the nuclear-weapon States should fulfill, because it was in the interest of improving the international security environment and removing the fundamental reason for some countries to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. The same State maintained that negative security assurances included two aspects, the first, that the nuclear-weapon States not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and the second, that the nuclear-weapon States should not first use nuclear weapons against each other. In the new international situation, the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first-use of nuclear weapons was against the trend of the times, and the relevant nuclear-weapon States should abandon this policy at an early date. It recalled that in 1994 it had formally proposed that the nuclear-weapon States should try to reach an agreement on non-first use of nuclear weapons and it put forward a draft text of such a treaty. It was still hoping for a positive response to its proposal.

"17. During the structured and thematic discussions provided for in the Programme of Work concerning the nature and scope of existing negative security assurances, including United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), Declarations of nuclear-weapon States, Protocols to the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties and their interpretative statements, one delegation stated that security assurances should be duly negotiated without any restrictions and should be drawn up in a legally-binding, universal, international instrument, as these assurances were essential for structural non-proliferation. The failure of the second Preparatory Committee of the NPT Review Conference and recent events in South Asia seriously jeopardized the structure of non-proliferation, and it was necessary to re-establish its credibility, which could only be achieved by making clear progress towards nuclear disarmament and by establishing a credible regime of assurances for non-nuclear States. Security assurances should be viewed as a temporary, provisional measure, until the final elimination of nuclear weapons was achieved. It felt that for humanitarian considerations, general guarantees

should be given without distinction as to the particular status of a country, and it would be up to the international community to grant these guarantees. Concerning the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, the delegation was prepared to study both negative security assurances and positive security assurances.

"18. Another delegation specified that Security Council resolution 984 of 1995 was adopted on the eve of the NPT Review Conference in order to encourage non-nuclear-weapon States to extend this Treaty indefinitely. However, in this delegation's view, the resolution contained numerous shortcomings and insufficiencies. Thus, it believed that this resolution could be withdrawn or amended through another resolution. It was not an official document which was negotiated and which reflected the concerns of the international community as a whole, particularly of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The unilateral declarations, which came only from one side, contained exceptions which actually emptied the resolution of its real content. This delegation categorically rejected the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In its view, the Committee should negotiate an international, legally-binding treaty which would provide all the security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States so that the NPT would have the necessary credibility. In this delegation's view, resolution 2 of the NPT Review and Extension Conference contained enormous shortcomings concerning the use of nuclear weapons.

"19. Still another delegation pointed out that the legal nature of the unilateral declarations and commitments of negative security assurances arose from the fact that the Council had taken note of these declarations in a formal way. In its analysis of the relevant Security Council resolutions, it indicated that it considered resolution 984 as a further evolution of the provisions of resolution 255. However, the latter was conceived and evolved in the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament, whereas resolution 984 was not referred to this single, multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and was evolved with the Security Council, quite independently from the Conference on Disarmament. This delegation thought that the most serious shortcoming of the security assurances offered in resolution 984, a flaw which also existed in resolution 255, was that these assurances were

restricted only to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT. It stated that it would continue to hold the view that the assurance of security to non-nuclear-weapon States was an obligation of the nuclear-weapon States and not something which they could or should offer in return for the signature of a non-proliferation treaty. Any linkage of security assurances to the signature of the NPT would be contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter, which did not discriminate between those who adhered to a particular and those who might not do. In its view, it was of the utmost importance to conclude a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons so as to bring about a general nuclear-free world and provide the fundamental assurance for mankind to rid itself of the threat of nuclear war.

"20. On the issue of common and distinctive elements, one nuclear-weapon State elaborated its position which existed among the different types of negative security assurances, which may have been given. It pinpointed the different ways in which these assurances had been given. The first was resolution 984, the second, through the Protocols of the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties, and the third, given to Ukraine on 5 December 1994. Politically, they all had similar value but clearly there was a difference between a resolution, a declaration and the signature of protocols in the framework of nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties, where the system was both contractual and legally-binding. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones constituted progress from the point of legal protection given to the States concerned, as compared with resolution 984, on condition that the States concerned by the treaties in question did themselves ratify the treaties they had negotiated and signed together. Turning to the application of article 51 of the United Nations Charter, this delegation pointed out that in certain exceptional cases, countries might have to reconcile the assurance regime and the right to self-defence, individual or collective, reflected, inter alia, through commitments or alliances, be they bilateral or multilateral.

"21. Another nuclear-weapon State reaffirmed the unconditional nature of its commitment, repeating that the security assurances provided by that country

to non-nuclear-weapon States were not confined only to non-nuclear- weapon States Parties to the NPT but rather to all non-nuclear-weapon States. It also elaborated its position on the relationship between negative security assurances and the doctrine and policy of nuclear deterrence saying that the nuclear deterrence policies pursued by the nuclear-weapon States, based on the first-use of nuclear weapons, made it difficult for the non-nuclear-weapon States to realize their aspirations of negative security assurances - the unconditional assurance of negative security guarantees. The nuclear-deterrence strategy, based on the Cold-War mentality, and the first-use of nuclear weapons, continued to exist. However, this practice was untimely and senseless. Nuclear deterrence was not in the interest of the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If a nuclear-weapon State asks the non-nuclear-weapon States to forego the nuclear option while insisting on retaining the possibility of striking them with nuclear weapons for itself, such a practice would run contrary to eliminating the motivation of certain countries to acquire and develop nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence reflected a security doctrine which was obsolete. This practice, based on building its own security on the non-security of others, was not in the interest of international peace and security. Under the new international circumstances, the nuclear-weapon States should, as soon as possible, renounce their nuclear-deterrence strategy and formulate a new security doctrine, in keeping with our times. They should take into fuller account the legitimate demand of the many non-nuclear-weapon States. On the question of negative security assurances, they should adopt a more positive, fair and reasonable approach and policy. At the same time, between the nuclear-weapon States, they should conclude the treaties on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. This would significantly contribute to the reduction of the danger of nuclear war and would be in the interest of mankind.

"22. Another nuclear-weapon State reiterated its position on the question of security assurances and emphasized the need not only for universal adherence but also for compliance with the NPT. It made it clear once again that its Government did not regard this assurance as applicable if any beneficiary was in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. Emphasizing the significance of regional arrangements in the form of nuclear-

weapon-free zones, it was, for its part, looking forward to adding new parties to such treaties. It stated that, like other nuclear-weapon States, it was working actively with ASEAN States to enable it to sign the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty and with Central Asian States on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region.

"23. A further nuclear-weapon State outlined its position and approach on negative security assurances, saying that it had always taken seriously the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT and over the years had pursued practical steps to address these concerns. Thus, its three Presidents, in 1968, 1978 and 1995, had issued national declarations on positive and/or negative security assurances, covering all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT. It unambiguously reaffirmed that the negative security assurances declaration of 5 April 1995 stood as an unequivocal statement of its global policy. Furthermore, the security assurances which that country had extended in the relevant Protocols to regional nuclear-weapon-free zones had been taken with no written reservations. They were legally-binding undertakings, consistent with generally recognized principles of international law not to use nuclear weapons. Speaking on its efforts and steps with the signature and the ratification of the relevant Protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties, it expressed its conviction that nearly one hundred non-nuclear-weapon States receiving legally-binding negative security assurances, through the nuclear-weapon-free zones, which they had initiated, negotiated and completed, demonstrated these assurances to be important, viable and legally-binding. It was also working closely with the States of Southeast Asia and Central Asia regions to increase the number of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT eligible for negative security assurances to well beyond the number of one hundred. This State was ready to consider any ideas on how negative security assurances and positive security assurance arrangements might be extended and/or improved, and it was also ready to consider other nuclear-weapon-free-zone proposals that were consistent with long-standing criteria for such zones and with the 1995 NPT Review Conference decision. According to this State, these developments demonstrated its clear resolve to address the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States through

presidential declarations, resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the encouragement of this Government's support and participation as Protocol party to the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties.

"24. Speaking about the scope of existing negative security assurances, one delegation maintained its position that such assurances should be provided in an internationally negotiated legally-binding instrument negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament, and that such assurances should be unconditional at all times. It felt that the current conditionality of the unilateral declarations was in contradiction with article 2 of the United Nations Charter. Turning to the specific situation of its region, it called upon the States which had not yet adhered to the NPT but had nuclear capability not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States unconditionally.

"25. One nuclear-weapon State briefly elaborated its national military doctrine, stating that it currently did not have any enemies and it was not threatened by war. It preferred non-military means of solving international problems, including collective action in the international community, against threats to peace and acts of aggression. Nevertheless, its military doctrine did allow that in the modern world, there still remained potential sources of the danger of war. It was particularly concerned at the expansion of military blocs and alliances, to the detriment of its interests.

"26. The Ad Hoc Committee briefly discussed some definitions, as provided by the Programme of Work. Some countries offered their interpretations of various terms indicated in the Programme. Some of those countries emphasized that a clear understanding of certain terms and provisions of existing document would help the Committee to progress to a better understanding of the needs of a future international instrument.

"27. One delegation suggested that the concept of 'collateral damage' should be added to the list of definitions (b) of the Programme of Work. This delegation referred to the consequences - legal and otherwise - that would flow from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons outside the

geographical area of a nuclear-weapon-free zone but whose effects would be visited on the area covered by the nuclear-weapon-free zones. The delegation felt that there was a need to study this concept further in the light of the global nature of the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

"28. However, another delegation pointed out that there was little practical significance in attempting to further clarify what was already understood. In its view, to do so would be a theoretical exercise so narrow, so specific and so limited that it would confuse rather than assist in the work of the Committee.

"29. One delegation stated that the qualifications or conditions which were implied by the items listed under (b) of the Programme of Work were not acceptable as a part of the unconditional guarantee of negative security assurances to non-nuclear- weapon States because any discussion of each of these items would indicate the broad nature of the definitions that each one of these items could be subjected to the subjective nature of such interpretations, and therefore, virtually, the complete nullification of any security assurances that may be provided with such qualifications.

"30. The Ad Hoc Committee addressed, in accordance with the Programme of Work, the issue of (c) new developments. Several States referred to the provision of unilateral declarations by the five nuclear-weapon States, the adoption of resolution 984 of the United Nations Security Council, the indefinite extension of the NPT and the adoption of the Final Document of this Conference, specifically the Principles and Objectives for Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, and the establishment of this Ad Hoc Committee. Some States also listed as a significant development the adoption of the Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice. Other States also added, as a negative development, the disappointing results of the second Preparatory Committee of the NPT Review Conference held in May of this year. Some delegations mentioned the evolution of the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty regimes since 1995. It should be noted that the discussions related to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice were inconclusive as while some claimed that the opinion and recommendations of

the International Court of Justice were legally-binding, other participants stated that the Court's findings were not binding on Governments, while another delegation questioned the relevance of the ICJ Advisory Opinion to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. Some delegations referred in this regard to the mandate of the International Criminal Court.

"31. One delegation indicated that in its view, other developments needed to be taken into account in the Ad Hoc Committee. These were: the notion that after the indefinite extension of the NPT, nuclear weapons could be retained *in perpetuity*, which derogated from the concept of security assurances as a transient and transitional measure until complete nuclear disarmament is achieved; new doctrines for the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against other weapons of mass destruction; the expansion of membership of nuclear security alliances; some nuclear-weapon States, which had in the past committed themselves to the non-first use of nuclear weapons, having disavowed that doctrine; and the demonstration of nuclear-weapons capability by two States, and the claim by one of them that it was a nuclear-weapon State, and the question of whether these States were entitled to receive or to give security assurances, together with one additional State presumed to possess nuclear weapons, which is also not party to the NPT.

"32. <u>On the issue of positive security assurances</u>, the discussions in the Committee revealed the existence of four trends. While the proponents of the first were prepared to elaborate further and to seek ways in which to improve them, and the second were prepared to discuss them although they expressed serious doubts and reservations as to the efficiency and practicality of existing positive security assurances, the third were of the view that positive guarantees did not lend themselves to multilateral negotiations and should not be dealt with in a body such as the Conference on Disarmament, and the fourth emphasized the significance of United Nations Security Council resolutions 255 and 984.

"33. During the discussions on the draft report, one delegation reiterated its position that the most appropriate venue for the consideration of negative security assurances was the NPT review process."

E. New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons; Radiological Weapons

39. The Conference did not establish an Ad Hoc Committee on this agenda item during the 1998 session. During plenary meetings of the Conference, some delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item, the detailed descriptions of which were duly recorded in the previous annual reports of the Conference, related official documents and working papers, as well as plenary records. The status of work on the agenda item is reflected in paragraphs 79-82 of the 1992 report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/1173).

F. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

40. The Conference did not establish an Ad Hoc Committee on this agenda item during the 1998 session. During plenary meetings of the Conference, some delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item, the detailed descriptions of which were duly recorded in the previous annual reports of the Conference, in particular paragraphs 83-89 of the 1992 report to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/1173), related official documents and working papers, as well as plenary records.

Anti-Personnel Landmines

41. In the course of the 1998 session of the Conference, the following documents dealing with this issue were presented:

(a) CD/1478, dated 30 September 1997, entitled "Letter dated 24 September 1997 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference from the Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva transmitting the text of the 'Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction' which was negotiated and adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Land Mines held in Oslo, 1-18

September 1997".

(b) CD/1479, dated 2 December 1997, entitled "Letter dated 26 November 1997 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations Office at Geneva transmitting the text of a Press Release concerning the decision by the Government of Indonesia to attend the Anti-Personnel Mines Treaty Signing Conference in Ottawa, Canada, on 2-4 December 1997 and sign the 'Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

(c) CD/1480, dated 13 January 1998, entitled "Letter dated 6 January 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Belarus addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference regarding extension of a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines".

(d) CD/1490, dated 28 January 1998, submitted by the delegation of the United States of America, entitled "Statement from the President of the United States upon the Occasion of the Opening Plenary of the 1998 Session of the Conference on Disarmament".

(e) CD/1493, dated 6 February 1998, entitled "Letter dated 3 February 1998 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference from the Permanent Representative of Egypt transmitting the text of resolution EB101.R23 adopted by the Executive Board of the World Health Organization on 27 January 1998, on the issue of 'Concerted Public Health Action on Anti-Personnel Mines'".

(f) CD/1495, dated 10 February 1998, submitted by the delegations of Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Venezuela, entitled "Draft decision".

(g) CD/1498, dated 23 February 1998, submitted by the delegation of South Africa, entitled "Media statement by South Africa's Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Mr. A.B. Nzo, on South African assistance in demining activities in Mozambique, issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, on 18 February 1998".

(h) CD/1514, dated 26 May 1998, entitled "Letter dated 22 May 1998 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference from the Permanent Representative of Egypt transmitting the text of resolution WHA51.8, adopted by the World Health Assembly on 16 May 1998, on the issue of "Concerted Public Health Action on Anti-Personnel Mines".

(i) CD/1546, dated 31 July 1998, submitted by the delegation of South Africa, entitled "Media Statement on the Depositing of South Africa's instrument of Ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction" and "Media Statement on South Africa's Declaration of Consent to be Bound to Protocol II, as amended, and Protocol IV of the Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)".

(j) CD/1553, dated 31 August 1998, entitled "Letter dated 28 August 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of resolution 1998/30 entitled "Injurious Effects of Anti-Personnel Landmines", adopted (without a vote) by the 50th session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on 26 August 1998".

42. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations elaborated their respective positions on this issue, the detailed descriptions of which were duly recorded in the plenary records of this session.

43. In discharging his mandate, the Special Coordinator appointed to seek the views of the Members of the Conference on the most appropriate way to deal with the questions related to anti-personnel landmines taking into account, inter alia, developments outside the Conference, held a number of bilateral and open-ended consultations and presented his reports in statements made on 25 June 1998

and 27 August 1998 respectively (CD/PV.799 and CD/PV.805).

G. Transparency in Armaments

44. The Conference did not establish an Ad Hoc Committee on this agenda item during the 1998 session. The following documents dealing with this item were presented to the Conference:

(a) CD/1489, dated 28 January 1998, entitled "Letter dated 27 January 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Norway addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a summary of Report No. 57 (1996/97) to the Storting on 'The Export of Weapons, Ammunition and Other Military Equipment in 1996'".

(b) CD/1494, dated 10 February 1998, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, entitled "Draft decision".

(c) CD/1544, dated 18 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 11 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting a copy of the text of the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the Council of the European Union at its meeting in Luxembourg on 8 June".

(d) CD/TIA/WP.33, dated 10 August 1998, entitled "Compilation of basic documents of the Conference on Disarmament relating to the question of transparency in armaments".

45. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item. These are duly recorded in the plenary records of this session.

46. In discharging his mandate, the Special Coordinator appointed to seek the views of the Members of the Conference on the most appropriate way to deal with the questions related to this item, held a number of bilateral and open-ended

consultations with members and participating non-members of the Conference and presented his reports in statements made on 25 June 1998 and 27 August 1998 respectively (CD/PV.799 and CD/PV.805).

H. Consideration of Other Areas Dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures

47. During its 1998 session, the Conference also had before it the following documents:

(a) CD/1477, dated 18 September 1997, entitled "Letter dated 15 September 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Canada addressed to the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the publication entitled "Cyberspace and Outer Space: Transitional Challenges for Multilateral Verification in the 21st Century - Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Ottawa NACD Verification Symposium".

(b) CD/1482, dated 15 January 1998, entitled "Note verbale dated 14 January 1998 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan transmitting the text of the resolution of the Eighth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference, held in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, from 9 to 11 December 1997, supporting the initiative of the Republic of Kazakhstan for convening a conference for interaction and confidence-building measures in Asia".

(c) CD/1488, dated 22 January 1998, entitled "Note verbale dated 21 January 1998 from the Permanent Mission of Mexico addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials, adopted on 13 November 1997 at the Twenty-Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States".

(d) CD/1491, dated 2 February 1998, entitled "Letter dated 28 January

1998 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine regarding ratification of the Agreement Between the Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency on Safeguards Application in Connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty".

(e) CD/1499, dated 4 March 1998, entitled "Letter dated 4 March 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the publication entitled 'International Workshop on Wound Ballistics, Interlaken and Thun, 7 and 8 October 1997, Switzerland'".

(f) CD/1503*, dated 24 April 1998, entitled "Letter dated 3 April 1998 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa addressed to the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting a media statement issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa on 31 March 1998 concerning South Africa's ratification of the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)".

(g) CD/1504, dated 12 May 1998, entitled "Letter dated 11 May 1998 from the Permanent Representative of India addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting a press statement issued in New Delhi on 11 May".

(h) CD/1504/Add.1, dated 13 May 1998, entitled "Letter dated 13 May 1998 from the Permanent Representative of India addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting a press statement issued in New Delhi on 13 May".

(i) CD/1505, dated 14 May 1998, entitled "Letter dated 14 May 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting remarks by President Clinton at a Press Conference on 12 May concerning Indian nuclear testing, as well as the text of a statement by the White House Press Secretary on 13 May 1998 concerning India sanctions".

(j) CD/1506, dated 15 May 1998, entitled "Letter dated 15 May 1998 from

the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan concerning the underground test of three nuclear explosive devices carried out by India on 11 May".

(k) CD/1507, dated 15 May 1998, entitled "Note verbale dated 15 May 1998 from the Permanent Mission of Ukraine addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference transmitting the text of a statement issued on 12 May 1998 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine concerning three underground nuclear tests carried out by India on 11 May".

(l) CD/1508, dated 15 May 1998, entitled "Letter dated 15 May 1998 from the Permanent Representative of China to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the President of the Conference transmitting the text of the statement issued on 14 May 1998 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China concerning India's nuclear tests".

(m) CD/1509, dated 15 May 1998, entitled "Letter dated 13 May 1998 to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Mission of Mexico transmitting the text of the press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Mexico concerning the conduct by India of three underground nuclear tests".

(n) CD/1510, dated 15 May 1998, submitted by the delegation of Mexico, entitled "Statement from the Rio Group".

(o) CD/1511, dated 19 May 1998, entitled "Letter dated 18 May 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary General of the Conference transmitting the text of a letter from the Prime Minister of Pakistan addressed to the leaders of the G-8 countries regarding the nuclear weapon tests conducted by India".

(p) CD/1512, dated 19 May 1998, entitled "Letter dated 18 May 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary General of the Conference transmitting the texts of a press release issued by the Defence

Committee of the Cabinet on 13 May 1998 and a statement by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan to the Senate of Pakistan on 13 May 1998".

(q) CD/1513, dated 26 May 1998, entitled "Letter dated 25 May 1998 addressed to the Secretary General of the Conference from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan transmitting the text of the statement made by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at a press conference held in Islamabad on 23 May 1998 regarding the situation arising from India's nuclear tests".

(r) CD/1515, dated 27 May 1998, entitled "Letter dated 25 May 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the President of the Conference transmitting a statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia at the Ministerial Meeting of the Bureau of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries at Cartagena on 19 May 1998 concerning the nuclear tests recently conducted by the Government of India".

(s) CD/1517, dated 29 May 1998, entitled "Note verbale dated 29 May 1998 from the Permanent Mission of Mexico addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a press release issued by the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Mexico concerning the conduct of underground nuclear-weapon tests by the Government of Pakistan".

(t) CD/1518, dated 2 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 31 May 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of a statement made by the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 28 May 1998 announcing the conduct of nuclear tests by Pakistan".

(u) CD/1519, dated 2 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 1 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of a statement made by the Foreign Secretary on 30 May 1998 following Pakistan's nuclear test that day".

(v) CD/1520, dated 2 June 1998, entitled "Note verbale dated 2 June 1998 from the Permanent Mission of Ukraine addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference transmitting the text of a statement issued on 28 May 1998 by the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine concerning five underground nuclear tests carried out by Pakistan on 28 May 1998".

(w) CD/1521, dated 2 June 1998, entitled "Note verbale dated 1 June 1998 from the Permanent Mission of Malaysia addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference transmitting the texts of two press releases issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia relating to the underground nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan".

(x) CD/1522, dated 2 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 2 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of remarks made by President Clinton on 28 and 30 May concerning Indian and Pakistani nuclear testing, as well as the text of a Presidential Determination regarding the imposition of sanctions on Pakistan".

(y) CD/1523, dated 2 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 2 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of India addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of the Suo Moto Statement of the Prime Minister of India, Mr. A.B. Vajpayee, to both the Houses of Parliament of India on 27 May 1998."

(z) CD/1524, dated 2 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 2 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of India addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of the paper laid on the table of both the Houses of Parliament of India entitled 'Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy'".

(aa) CD/1525, dated 2 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 2 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of India addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of a statement of the official Spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs, 28 May 1998."

(bb) CD/1526, dated 2 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 2 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of India addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of a reply given by the official Spokesman of

the Ministry of External Affairs to a question on Pakistan's nuclear test, 30 May 1998."

(cc) CD/1527, dated 2 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 2 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Poland addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of a statement issued by the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland on 28 May 1998."

(dd) CD/1528, dated 3 June 1998, entitled "Note verbale dated 2 June 1998 from the Permanent Mission of Chile addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting two statements issued by the Government of Chile on 11 and 28 May 1998 in connection with the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan, respectively".

(ee) CD/1529, dated 3 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 3 June 1998 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Romania addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of a statement by the President of Romania while on a State visit to Canada on 29 May 1998 taking notice of the dangerous escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan."

(ff) CD/1530, dated 3 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 3 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of a joint statement by Mr. Guido Di Tella, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina and Mrs. Tarja Halonen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland on the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests."

(gg) CD/1531, dated 3 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 3 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Mongolia addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of a statement made by the Ministry of External Relations of Mongolia relating to a series of nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan".

(hh) CD/1532, dated 3 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 2 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Belarus addressed to the Secretary-General of

the Conference transmitting the text of a statement on the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus on 1 June 1998".

(ii) CD/1533, dated 4 June 1998, entitled "Note Verbale dated 2 June 1998 from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Lithuania addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of a statement issued on 29 May 1998 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania concerning the underground nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan".

(jj) CD/1534, dated 28 May 1998, entitled "Letter dated 28 May 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the section entitled 'Disarmament and International Security' from the Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held in Cartagena de Indias on 19 and 20 May 1998".

(kk) CD/1535, dated 5 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 2 June 1998 from the Permanent Observer of the Holy See addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the statement made by the Director of the Press Office of the Holy See concerning the recent nuclear tests".

(ll) CD/1536, dated 5 June 1998, submitted by the delegation of Australia, entitled "Statements made by Mr. Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs on 28, 29 and 30 May 1998 regarding Pakistan's nuclear tests".

(mm) CD/1537, dated 5 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 3 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of a press release issued by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on 29 May 1998 concerning the nuclear tests conducted recently by Pakistan".

(nn) CD/1538, dated 5 June 1998, entitled "Note verbale dated 3 June

1998 from the Permanent Mission of the Argentine Republic addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a press communique issued by the Government of the Argentine Republic on 28 May 1998, a communique issued by the Rio Group on 29 May 1998 and Resolution C/E/RES.39 adopted on 29 May 1998 by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)".

(oo) CD/1539, dated 8 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 5 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the texts of a press release issued by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 12 May 1998 and a press statement by the Foreign Minister of Sweden on 28 May 1998".

(pp) CD/1540, dated 8 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 5 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of a statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on 28 May 1998".

(qq) CD/1541, dated 9 June 1998, entitled, "Letter dated 8 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the texts of statements made by the Government of the Republic of South Africa with regard to the nuclear tests explosions carried out by India and Pakistan".

(rr) CD/1543, dated 12 June 1998, entitled "Letter dated 12 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of a statement issued by Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 11 June 1998 regarding Pakistan's proposal for resumption of dialogue with India".

(ss) CD/1552, dated 27 August 1998, entitled "Letter dated 24 August 1998 from the Permanent Representatives of Brazil, Chile and Argentina addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the Political Declaration of Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile as a Zone of Peace

signed by the Governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay at Ushuaia, Argentine Republic, on 24 July 1998".

(tt) CD/1556, dated 7 September 1998, entitled "Letter dated 2 September 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Norway addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of "An International Agenda on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Elements of a Common Understanding" from the Oslo Meeting on Small Arms, 13-14 July 1998".

I. Consideration and Adoption of the Annual Report of the Conference and any other Report as Appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations

48. To promote substantive progress during its 1999 session, the Conference requested the current President and the incoming President to conduct appropriate consultations during the intersessional period and make recommendations, if possible, that could help to commence early work on various agenda items. These consultations may, inter alia, take into account views presented and discussions held in the 1998 session.

49. The Conference decided that the dates for its 1999 session would be:

First part: 18 January-26 March 1999

Second part: 10 May-25 June 1999

Third part: 26 July-8 September 1999

50. The annual report to the fifty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, as adopted by the Conference on 8 September 1998, is transmitted by the President on behalf of the Conference on Disarmament.

Ian Soutar
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
President of the Conference

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1558
15 September 1998

Original: ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 14 SEPTEMBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXTS OF FOUR JOINT STATEMENTS ISSUED BY PRESIDENTS YELTSIN AND CLINTON DURING THEIR RECENT SUMMIT MEETING IN MOSCOW

Attached are the Russian and English language texts of four Joint Statements issued by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton during their recent summit meeting in Moscow:

1. Joint Statement on the Exchange of Information on Missile Launches and Early Warning

2. Joint Statement on a Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons

3. Joint Statement of Principles for Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes

4. Joint Statement on Common Security Challenges at the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century

We would be grateful if you would issue these texts as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member states and non-member participants of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Vasily S. Sidorov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Head of Delegation of the
Russian Federation to the
Conference on Disarmament

(Signed) Robert T. Grey, Jr.
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the United States to the
Conference on Disarmament

JOINT STATEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON MISSILE LAUNCHES AND EARLY WARNING

Taking into account the continuing worldwide proliferation of ballistic missiles and of missile technologies, the need to minimize even further the consequences of a false missile attack warning and above all, to prevent the possibility of a missile launch caused by such false warning, the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation have reached agreement on a cooperative initiative between the United States and Russia regarding the exchange of information on missile launches and early warning.

The objective of the initiative is the continuous exchange of information on the launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles derived from each side's missile launch warning system, including the possible establishment of a center for the exchange of missile launch data operated by the United States and Russia and separate from their respective national centers. As part of this initiative, the United States and Russia will also examine the possibility of establishing a multilateral ballistic missile and space launch vehicle pre-launch notification regime in which other states could voluntarily participate.

The Presidents have directed their experts to develop as quickly as possible for approval in their respective countries a plan for advancing this initiative toward implementation as soon as practicable.

Russia, proceeding from its international obligations relating to information derived from missile attack warning systems, will reach agreement regarding necessary issues relating to the implementation of this initiative.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

THE PRESIDENT OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

Moscow

September 2, 1998

JOINT STATEMENT ON A PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation, recognizing the threat posed by biological weapons, express strong support for the aims and tasks of the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to establish a regime to enhance the effective implementation of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. We urge the further intensification and successful conclusion of those negotiations to strengthen the Convention by adoption of a legally binding Protocol at the earliest possible date.

We have agreed to contribute to accomplishing these tasks. Consequently, the United States of America and the Russian Federation will make additional efforts in the Ad Hoc Group to promote decisive progress in negotiations on the Protocol to the Convention, to ensure its universality and enable the Group to fulfill its mandate.

We agree that the Protocol to the Convention must be economical to implement, must adequately guarantee the protection of national security information, and must provide confidentiality for sensitive commercial information. We also consider it extremely important to create a mechanism for implementation that will be consistent with the scope of the measures provided for in the Protocol.

We recognize the necessity for the Protocol to include those measures that would do the most to strengthen the Convention.

We express our firm commitment to global prohibition of biological weapons and for full and effective compliance by States Parties with the Convention prohibiting such weapons.

We support the language in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention (1996) that the Convention forbids the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons under any circumstances.

Moscow

September 2, 1998

JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSITION OF PLUTONIUM DESIGNATED AS NO LONGER REQUIRED FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES

The Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation affirm the intention of each country to remove by stages approximately 50 metric tons of plutonium from their nuclear weapons programs, and to convert this material so that it can never be used in nuclear weapons. Recognizing that further arms reductions will increase such plutonium, measures to manage and reduce such stockpiles are an essential element of irreversible arms reduction efforts and are necessary to ensure that these materials do not become a proliferation risk.

As an essential step in achieving this goal, at the July 1998 meeting of their Joint Commission, the U.S. and Russia reached agreement on scientific and technical cooperation in the management of plutonium that has been withdrawn from nuclear military programs. We have agreed on principles that will guide our governments in cooperating to achieve the objectives set forward in this statement. Our work today builds on the achievements of the 1996 Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security, and of the 1997 and 1998 G-8 Summits.

We have agreed on the following principles:

-- The U.S. and Russia will each convert approximately 50 tons of plutonium withdrawn in stages from nuclear military programs into forms unusable for nuclear weapons. We recognize that interim storage will be required for this material.

-- The two governments will cooperate to pursue this goal through consumption of plutonium fuel in existing nuclear reactors (or reactors which may enter into service during the duration of our cooperation) or the immobilization of plutonium in glass or ceramic form mixed with high-level radioactive waste.

-- The U.S. and Russia expect that the comprehensive effort for the management and disposition of this plutonium will be a broad-based multilateral one, and welcome close cooperation and coordination with other countries, including those of the G-8. They further intend to encourage partnership with private industry.

-- In cooperation with others, the U.S. and Russia will, as soon as practically feasible and according to a time frame to be negotiated by the two governments, develop and operate an initial set of industrial-scale facilities for the conversion of plutonium to fuel for the above-mentioned existing reactors.

-- Conditions on cooperative projects for plutonium management and disposition will be determined by mutual consent of the parties participating in those projects.

-- In the plutonium management and disposition effort, the U.S. and Russia will seek to develop acceptable methods and technology for transparency measures, including appropriate international verification measures and stringent standards of physical protection, control, and accounting for

the management of plutonium.

-- We also recognize that in order for this effort to be carried out, it will be necessary to agree upon appropriate financing arrangements.

Both sides will develop strategies for the management and disposition of plutonium, taking into account the July 1998 agreement as well as a bilateral agreement, based on the principles set forth in this statement. They will initiate negotiation of this bilateral agreement promptly with the intention of concluding the agreement by the end of this calendar year.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

Moscow

September 2,1998

JOINT STATEMENT ON COMMON SECURITY CHALLENGES AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

We, the Presidents of the United States of America and of the Russian Federation, declare that cooperation between the U.S. and Russia will be of the greatest import in the twenty-first century for promoting prosperity and strengthening security throughout the world. In this connection, we reaffirm that the United States of America and the Russian Federation are natural partners in advancing international peace and stability. We have devoted particular attention to intensifying joint efforts to eliminate threats inherited from the Cold War and to meet common security challenges at the threshold of the twenty-first century.

We understand that the most serious and pressing danger is the proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical, and other types of weapons of mass destruction, the technologies for their production, and their means of delivery. Given the increasing interdependence of the modern world, these threats are becoming transnational and global in scope; they affect not only the national security of the United States and the Russian Federation, but also international stability. We reaffirm the determination of the U.S. and Russia to cooperate actively and closely with each other, as well as with all other interested countries, to avert and reduce this threat by taking new steps, seeking new forms of collaboration, and strengthening generally recognized international norms.

We recognize that more must be done and today we have taken a number of steps to enhance not only our security, but global security as well. We are declaring our firm commitment to intensifying negotiations toward early completion of the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol. We are embarking on new and important cooperation to further lessen the risks of false warnings of missile attacks. And, we have agreed on principles to guide our cooperation in the management and disposition of plutonium from nuclear weapons programs so that it can never again be used in a nuclear weapon.

Common commitments have made the U.S. and Russia partners in developing the foundations of an international non-proliferation regime, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA safeguards, the Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Russia and the U.S. reaffirm their commitment to the goal of having all countries accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in its present form, without amendments. They are also committed to the strengthened guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. As participants in the Conference on Disarmament, they jointly achieved success in the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention and of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and call upon all countries to accede to these treaties. Guided by these obligations, they have taken substantial practical steps to reduce the global nuclear threat and control transfers of sensitive technology. They remain deeply concerned about the nuclear tests in South Asia and reaffirm U.S. and Russian commitments to coordinate closely support for all steps set forth in the Joint Communique of the "P-5", as endorsed by the G-8 and the UN Security Council.

The START Treaty and Presidents' nuclear arms reduction initiatives in 1991-92 will help to ensure the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament and enhance international security. We have together eliminated more than 1,700 heavy bombers and missile launchers, including more than

700 launch silos, 45 submarines capable of launching nuclear missiles, and deactivated or eliminated more than 18,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads. Reaffirming our commitment to strict compliance with our obligations under the START I and ABM Treaties, we declare our resolve to collaborate in expediting the entry into force of the START II Treaty. Immediately after Russian ratification of START II, the U.S. and Russia will begin negotiations regarding lower levels within the framework of a START III Treaty.

As a result of significant reductions in their nuclear forces, the United States and Russia have large stockpiles of nuclear materials that are no longer needed for defense purposes. They remain committed to providing the maximum degree of security and accountability for these and other stockpiles of weapons-grade fissile materials and reaffirm the importance of implementing the U.S. Vice President's and Russian Prime Minister's July 1998 Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Management of Plutonium that has been Withdrawn from Nuclear Military Programs.

We reaffirm our commitment to further cooperation on export controls as an essential part of ensuring non-proliferation. Our governments recently created an additional mechanism for cooperation in the field of exports of sensitive technology. To this end, at our meeting today we agreed to establish expert groups on nuclear matters, missile and space technology, catch-all and internal compliance, conventional weapons transfers controls, as well as law enforcement, customs matters, and licensing in order to enhance cooperation and to implement specific bilateral assistance and cooperative projects. These groups will be formed within the next month and begin practical activities without delay. A protected communications channel between senior officials of both countries has also been established, which will ensure the rapid and confidential exchange of information on non-proliferation matters.

We reaffirmed the importance of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and its fundamental contribution to stability, predictability and cooperation in Europe. As we work together to build a more integrated and secure Europe, we are committed to accelerating the negotiations to adapt the Treaty to changing circumstances. We consider it necessary to complete work on adapting the Treaty in the nearest future. We reaffirm our commitment to comply with the Treaty's provisions during the process of its adaptation.

The U.S. and Russia remain committed to jointly building an enduring peace based upon the principles of democracy and the indivisibility of security. They reaffirm the common objective of strengthening security and stability in the interest of all countries, and combating aggressive nationalism and preventing abuses of human rights. They will consult with each other and strive to cooperate in averting and settling conflicts and in crisis management. In this regard, we attach great importance to operational military cooperation, in both bilateral and multilateral settings, between the armed forces of the U.S. and Russia. We are pleased to note that definite progress has been achieved in the area of defense cooperation, particularly in strengthening nuclear security and in implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

We recognize that the soundness of an increasingly interdependent world financial and economic system affects the well-being of people in all countries. We agree on the importance to the international community of the success of economic and structural reform in Russia.

Strengthening environmental protection in the 21st century is imperative in order to protect natural systems on which humanity depends. Russia and the U.S. will work together to resolve the global climate problem, to preserve the ozone layer, to conserve biodiversity, and to ensure the sustainable management of forests and other natural resources. We underscored the necessity of deepening broad based international and bilateral cooperation in this area.

We declare that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, irrespective of its motives, is utterly unacceptable. The U.S. and Russia harshly condemn the recent terrorist bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. At our meeting today we agreed on a series of actions that respond to this growing scourge.

We agreed to intensify joint efforts to counteract the transnational threats to our economies and security, including those posed by organized crime, the narcotics trade, the illegal arms trade, computer and other high-technology crime, and money laundering. We agreed to establish a bilateral law enforcement working group that will meet on a regular basis, and we agreed to step up law enforcement efforts and improve the public information system to eradicate trafficking in women and children. We agreed that the United States and Russia will take an active part in working out an effective UN convention to combat transnational organized crime. We welcome Russia's hosting of a G-8 transnational crime conference at the ministerial level in Moscow in 1999.

We recognize the importance of promoting the positive aspects and mitigating the negative aspects of the information technology revolution now taking place, which is a serious challenge to ensuring the future strategic security interests of our two countries. As part of the efforts to resolve these problems the U.S. and Russia have already held productive discussions within the framework of the Defense Consultative Group on resolving the potential Year 2000 computer problem. The U.S. and Russia are committed to continuing consultations and to studying the wider consequences of this computer problem in order to resolve issues of mutual interest and concern.

We declare that the common security challenges on the threshold of the twenty-first century can be met only by consistently mobilizing the efforts of the entire international community. All available resources must be utilized to do so. In the event that it is necessary, the world community must promptly take effective measures to counter such threats. The U.S. and Russia will continue to play a leadership role bilaterally and multilaterally to advance common objectives in the area of security.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

Moscow

September 2, 1998



CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1559
21 October 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TURKEY ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF TURKEY ISSUED ON 15 OCTOBER 1998, CONCERNING THE EXTENSION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE MORATORIUM ON ALL ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINE EXPORTS AND TRANSFERS

I have the honour to communicate to you the text of a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey issued on 15 October 1998, concerning the extension for another three years of the comprehensive moratorium on all anti-personnel landmine exports and transfers introduced by Turkey in 1996.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed) Murat Sungar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.98-64213

STATEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF TURKEY

An integral part of efforts aimed at preventing proliferation of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) are the resolutions since 1993 of the United Nations General Assembly calling on member States to implement a moratorium on the export of landmines. In light of these resolutions, Turkey, who has in fact been implementing a de facto moratorium by not exporting any APLs in recent years, declared on 17 January 1996 on a unilateral basis a comprehensive moratorium on all anti-personnel landmine exports and transfers for a renewable term of three years. In view of the ratification of the Ottawa Convention by forty states and its entry into force as of March 1, 1999, Turkey, as a renewed expression of her determination to contribute to the ongoing efforts of the international community aimed at preventing the casualties caused by APLs and her commitment to the humanitarian objectives of the relevant international instruments in this field, decided to extend this moratorium for another three years commencing from its expiry.

Since the initial stages Turkey has been giving support and making contributions to the efforts undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament with a view to achieving a global transfer ban on APLs. Furthermore, Turkey has also initiated contacts with some of her neighbours to establish bilateral regimes for keeping the common borders free from APLs and preventing their use in border areas in the future.

On the other hand, in spite of the sensitivity of the international community and the positive steps taken on this issue, it is regrettable to see the ongoing use of APLs in an indiscriminative manner by various terrorist organizations targeting everyone, including women and children. We believe that our decision to extend the existing moratorium will contribute significantly to the efforts towards a global ban on APLs.

Ankara, 15 October 1998